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Eleven Theses on Sound and Transcendence
Brian Kane
I. Listening can only be localized in the ear by force of reduction. 
Imagine a room (call it the “music room”), in which sounds are heard; 
any normal person entering the room is presented with sounds which are 
audible only there, but which can be traced to no specific source . . . A 
specific sound—middle C at such and such a volume, and with such and 
such a timbre—can be heard in the room. Yet there are, let us suppose, no 
physical vibrations in the room: no instrument is sounding, and nothing 
else happens there, besides this persistent tone.1 
The “music room” is a hypothetical. To function, it requires the force of 
reduction. This is most apparent in the claim that, “let us suppose,” these 
sounds are correlated to no physical vibration. That moment authorizes 
the philosopher to distinguish the sonic from the musical: one vibrational, 
with everything that comes in tow, such as the acoustic, the resonant, the 
spatial, and the causal; the other, a pure event bathed in divine ontological 
indifference. 
II. To split the senses one needs technê.
[The acousmatic situation] symbolically precludes any relation with 
what is visible, touchable, measurable. Moreover, between the experience 
of Pythagoras and our experiences of radio and recordings, the differ-
ences separating direct listening (through a curtain) and indirect listening 
(through a speaker) in the end become negligible.2 
Don’t be fooled by this dubious negligibility. Even if one were to doggedly 
maintain the historical difference that distinguishes the Pythagorean curtain 
from the loudspeaker, the conceptual difference would be subsumed, for the 
modern–day akousmatikoi, by the end to which the technology is applied. 
Even the “music room” would require some hidden technology to remove 
the vibration from sound; otherwise it would be a supernatural experience. 
Technê is the prerequisite for isolating a sense modality. 
A philosopher’s rule of thumb: veiling the visual unveils the auditory—and 
veiling is a technique.
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III. Technê is to be understood as both technique and 
technology, no matter how rudimentary. 
Cognitive scientists and German romantics agree: the closed eyelid and 
averted glance are the most rudimentary acousmatic techniques!
Closing one’s eyes while listening to sound . . . evokes shifts in style of 
processing by modifying focus of attention, while keeping targeted stimuli 
the same. The main outcome of such a shift could enhance the perceived 
intensity of emotional stimulus, making positive attributes more positive 
and negative ones more negative . . . Closing the eyes indeed characterizes 
a specific brain state that can be affected by the individual’s mental set. 
Accordingly . . . eyes closed position represents a well defined mental 
set by which perceived emotionality can be modulated, thus probing its 
neural respect.3
Whenever Joseph [Berglinger] was at a big concert, he seated himself in a 
corner, without looking at the brilliant gathering of auditors, and listened 
with the very same reverence as if he were in church, —— just as quietly 
and motionlessly and with his eyes fixed upon the ground before him . . . 4
The eyelid can be projected outward, onto screens, veils and coverings: 
To explain the plan of the festival–theater now in course of erection at 
Bayreuth I believe I cannot do better than to begin with the need I felt the 
first, that of rendering invisible the mechanical source of its music, to wit 
the orchestra . . . 5
The prevailing doctrine of nineteenth–century music aesthetics—the 
idea of “absolute” music, divorced from purposes and causes, subjects 
and clear–cut emotions—gave rise . . . to the demand for an “invisible 
orchestra” concealing the mundane origins of transcendental music. What 
Wagner was able to institute in Bayreuth was also, around 1900, attempted 
in the concert hall.6
Or permanently sealed in its sublimation by sound recording:
At the time when music critic Paul Bekker was trying his hand as opera 
house director, he may have been the first to have spoken of opera as a 
museum . . . The form of the LP makes it possible for more than a few 
musically engaged people to build up such a museum for themselves. Nor 
need they fear that the recorded works will be neutralized in the process, as 
they are in the opera houses . . . these recordings awaken to a second life in 




IV. Technê cannot be subordinated to physis. 
Do not be persuaded by purposiveness. The end to which technê is 
applied does not mean the end of technê. To resist the hardheaded 
forgetfulness of purposiveness, one could do worse than follow the 
Peripatetic as he takes art and nature—technê and physis—for a walk. 
Step one: “Art imitates nature.”8 Technê, which follows after the prod-
ucts of physis, develops its capacities by copying from the works of 
nature. Technê would take what physis has already provided, as a 
model, and imitate it. Technê reproduces, replicates, or copies an original. 
Step two: “Technê carries to the end what physis is incapable of effecting.”9 
Technê has no model, it reproduces nothing given; rather, it gives itself 
over to supplement a deficiency or lack found in physis. The blockage 
that halts the achievement of physis is overcome by a technique, trick, 
know–how or art. Yet what comes to the aid of physis lacks physis altogether. 
How can technê both imitate nature, and thus duplicate the model that nature 
provides, while simultaneously perfecting or accomplishing what nature 
cannot achieve? Where would technê have learned its skill at fulfilling nature’s 
ends (and better than nature itself)? How can technê be both disciple and 
master of physis? The Peripatetic’s competing views about the relationship 
of physis and technê cannot be consistently reconciled (with apologies to the 
apologetic Ancient commentators). If technê comes to the aid of physis, and 
brings physis to completion, then physis cannot be conceived as a simple 
plenitude or potentiality without lack. Thus the inability of physis to realize 
its ends without the aid of technê reveals that the relationship of the two 
cannot be simple subordination. Rather, the relationship is supplementary. 
(Don’t believe me? Get a load of this: “The supplement adds itself, it is 
a surplus, a plenitude enriching another plenitude . . . It cumulates and 
accumulates presence. It is thus that art, technê, image, representation, 
convention, etc. come as supplements to nature and are rich with this entire 
culminating function.”10)
V. Veiling is the technê of truth. 
And while we’re speaking of plenitude: 
[Heidegger] enabled us to perceive the ontological plenitude or the truth 
that addresses us in art through the twofold movement of revealing, 
unconcealing, and manifesting, on the one hand, and concealing and 
sheltering, on the other.11 
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Heidegger’s essence of truth depends on the the double movement of 
concealing and unconcealing, argued via an appeal to an anamnesis of the 
Greek notion of truth, ἀλήθεια (aletheia), a condition of being un–hidden 
or dis–closed. The essence of truth, as the overcoming of hiddenness, also 
contains the nonessence of truth. This is to be contrasted with the view that 
untruth is simply a human deficiency, as if the truth were simply “out there” 
but inaccessible because of a failure of human cognition or intellect. 
Originally for the Greeks hiddenness, as an act of self–hiding, permeated 
the essence of being and thus also determined beings in their presentness 
and accessibility (“truth”); and that is why the Greek word for what the 
Romans call “veritas” and for what we call “truth” was distinguished by 
the alpha–privative (ἀ–λήθεια). Truth originally means what has been 
wrested from hiddenness. Truth is thus a wresting away in each case, in 
the form of a revealing. The hiddenness can be of various kinds: closing 
off, hiding away, disguising, covering over, masking, dissembling. Since, 
according to Plato’s “allegory,” the supremely unhidden must be wrested 
from a base and stubborn hiding . . . [it] gives us a special glimpse into 
how “privation”—attaining the unhidden by wresting it away—belongs 
to the essence of truth.12 
Heidegger offers an exposition of the essence of truth through a reading of 
Plato’s allegory of the cave. In Heidegger’s reading, the confusion of idea and 
eidos distorts the original meaning of aletheia by turning the essence of truth 
into an anthropomorphic adequacy of (human) subject and object. Alethetia 
must be recovered from this distortion. Yet, the anamnesis of the essence 
of truth as aletheia doesn’t clear out the ghosts of purposiveness that haunt 
Heidegger’s views. The double movement of concealing and unconcealing 
ultimately avoids the problem of physis and technê, of hiddenness as the 
technê of the unhidden, of truth’s physis. If “concealment preserves what is 
most proper to ἀλήθεια as its own,” then what is proper to concealment?13 
Is hiddenness only to be the handmaiden of unconcealedness, the matrix 
from which aletheia perpetually wrests itself? 
Heidegger neglects to note how the opening passages of the “allegory” 
allegorize the role played by technê in the production of truth. When 
Socrates describes the cave’s mise–en–scene to Glaucon, one might recall its 
archi–tectural design. (Note the use of present perfect tense.) 
Between the fire and those who are shacked there runs a walkway at a 
certain height. Imagine that a low wall has been built the length of the 




And don’t neglect the sound design either: 
And now what if this prison also had an echo reverberating off the wall in 
front of them? Whenever one of the people walking behind those in chains 
would make a sound, do you think the prisoners would imagine that the 
speaker were anyone other than the shadows passing in front of them?15
Here technê has already set the stage for a scene of aletheia, of wresting away 
one’s perpetual (cue the litany) closing off, hiding away, disguising, covering 
over, masking, dissembling. The physis or essence of truth as unconcealedness 
is wrested away from that which is concealed only after the stage has been 
properly set for the production of concealment. Technê can be nothing more 
than an unconcealment effect. A repoussoir. 
VI. Transcendence is a form of separation. 
A narrow definition of transcendence: that which lies beyond our sense 
modalities and knowledge, and thus a form of separation. The transcendent is 
separated from the everyday world of sensation, knowledge and experience. 
According to the Sage of Königsberg: 
we will call the principles whose application stays wholly and completely 
within the limits of possible experience immanent, but those that would 
fly beyond these boundaries transcendent principles.16 
Transcendent principles are those that “incite us to tear down all those 
boundary posts and to lay claim to a wholly new territory that recognizes 
no demarcations anywhere.” And thus, “transcendental and transcendent 
are not the same.” Indeed, a condition of the possibility of experience is not 
an experience of the unconditioned. 
This narrow definition must be relaxed when moving outside the boundar-
ies of philosophy. While preserving the importance of separation, there is 
a broader definition of transcendence: the positing of any sphere (whether 
it be religious, secular, philosophical, ethical, aesthetic or otherwise) that 
exists outside the bounds of the mundane world, and which is manifested 
to this world only at special or singular moments. One could easily ap-
peal to Wagner’s description of the “mystic gulf,” charged with the task of 
“part[ing] reality from ideality,” however I prefer this anonymous bit of 
musical prolepsis from 1826.
Imagine a hall in which, first of all, the orchestra with its people and 
instruments is hidden from the audience’s view by a light curtain, this 
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would put a whole crowd of destructive demons in chains, not to mention 
how much more atmospheric music becomes when it resounds unseen. 
Imagine further that instead of the many burning candles there is a single 
hanging light, which gives forth only as much subdued illumination as 
wretched decency demands . . . Would not the dim light, full of forebod-
ing, compose the souls of those who entered, purifying away the dross of 
everyday life and setting them into that mood which alone is appropriate 
for the enjoyment of art? Would not the spring–like sounds, coming as 
though from another world, lift these poor earthly worms, swimming in 
the sludge of the everyday world, for a moment at least into the bright, 
heavenly regions of a more beautiful world?17
VII. Sound has often been understood as the site for the 
revelation of transcendence.
Ἀρμονία. Q. E. D.
VIII. The divided sensorium is applied to support the production 
of transcendence. 
In eighteenth–century aesthetics, the experience of music often prefigured 
the angelic choir. 
Every Saturday evening at the hour of Compine one sings the Salve Regina 
. . . thus, at the appointed hour therein one finds music, the organist and 
the sacerdotes . . . the music begins and the organ responds, and then 
the organ and the music [sound] together, with such sweetness and such 
beautiful harmonies, which, because they seem an angelic choir, generate in 
the hearts of the listeners a whole–hearted composure and a holy devotion 
to the Mother of God.18
In Milan, Federigo Borromeo, employed the trope of the angelic voice in 
his discourses on music. In his Assumption Day sermon, Borromeo began 
with the topos of the angelic song, “surely no accident considering that the 
prelate’s audience was probably composed of musical nuns” and returned to 
the trope as a musical model to be imitated by the nuns’ own performances.19 
This model went hand in hand with a prohibition on vanity during the nun’s 
performances, which had begun to veer, for Church officials, uncomfortably 
close to the kinds of spectacular musical performances taking place outside 
the cloister.
In the period following the Council of Trent, when the practice of clausura 
was instituted, it was declared that nuns “should, without exception, be 
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confined within convent walls.”20 Many of the convents were walled in, with 
only grilles to allow for the passage of sound. 
[The Tridentine Reforms are] so esteemed not only in Rome but through 
al Italy that thou shalt never see Nonne out of her Cloister, and being in 
the Churche thou shalt only hear their voices singing their service most 
melodiously, and the Father him self, that is, their Ghostly father heareth 
their confession through a grate in a wall, where only voice and no sight 
goeth between: and I have seen the blessed Cardinal of Milan Borromaeo 
say Masse in their Chapel at Milan before them, when I could not possibly 
see any of them . . . and in Bononie [Bologna] and Rome having been many 
times at their service in the Chappels and hearing the goodly singing, never 
did I yet see one of them.21 
Sound, which penetrates and pierces enclosures, became an important 
mechanism by which the nuns could still be present to the world beyond the 
convent wall. Although the voice of the nun can resemble the voice of the 
angel even without any kind of visual reduction, clausura can be understood 
as a technology that, despite its obviously repressive aspects, splits the senses 
in order to make the transcendent audition of the angelic voice all the more 
sensuous. The Convent of Santi Domenico e Sisto in Rome, in addition to 
containing a extraordinarily high altar with grated windows above it, to the 
left and the right, possessed an interior punctured by a series of grated open-
ings placed high up near the vaults that circled the church. The voices ema-
nating from these high grates were juxtaposed against the frescoed ceilings, 
depicting images of the heavenly host. The architectural space reinforced the 
fantasy: the listeners were encouraged to identify the vocalic body, imagined 
in the nuns’ voices, with the celestial figures floating above their heads.22 
But the trope was never completely secured. The vocalic body heard in the 
nun’s voice could just as easily be associated with an angelic source as with 
the actual mundane, and potentially erotic, body from where it emerged. 
For Rousseau, the dialectics of the angelic voice fascinated and maddened 
him on his trip to Venice in 1743. 
Every Sunday, in the church . . . motets are sung during vespers, for full 
choir and orchestra, composed and conducted by the greatest masters in 
Italy and sung in the grilled galleries by these girls, the oldest of whom is 
under twenty. I cannot conceive of anything so pleasurable or so moving as 
that music . . . Never did Carrio or I miss those vespers in the Mendicanti, 
and we were not the only ones. The church was full of music–lovers; even 
singers from the opera came here to have a real lesson in tasteful singing 
from these excellent models. What distressed me were the accursed grilles, 
which only let the sound through but concealed those angels of beauty—for 
the singing was worthy of angels—from my sight.
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Rousseau’s erotic drive to peer behind the grilles and behold the (real) 
heavenly body fantasized in the nun’s voice, leads to a cruel and misogynist 
joke. After begging, Rousseau is taken to meet the girls. 
As we entered the room where sat these beauties I had so desired, I felt 
such an amorous trembling as I had never known. M. Le Blond introduced 
me to one of these famous singers after another, whose names and voices 
were all I knew of them. “Come Sophie” . . . She was hideous. “Come, 
Cattina” . . . She had only one eye. “Come, Bettina” . . . She was disfigured 
by small pox . . . Two or three, however, seemed passable to me; they only 
sang in the chorus.23 
In the musical art–religion of the nineteenth century, the grilles of the 
convents were reinstalled, now as injunctions to obscure and erase the traces 
of musical performance. 
The sonorous element in music . . . [is] the ultimate consideration. The 
visual element of the performance does not belong to the work’s essence 
. . . It is for this reason that orchestral musicians rightly appear in the 
simplest clothes; it would be best if they were not visible at all.24
We could say that Berglinger’s averted glance became an architectural apriori 
for constructing the ideal concert hall. 
I would like to see a hall which is rather small, seating no more than a 
thousand persons, with only one kind of seat throughout, with no boxes, 
neither large nor small. I would like the orchestra to be out of sight so that 
neither the musicians nor the lights of the music desks can be seen by the 
audience. This would create a magical effect . . . 25
The presence of the orchestra amongst the audience, playing in full view 
of them, is every bit as disturbing as would be the sight of the back stage 
machinery and the stage hands working away on it . . . 26
Or, when the concert hall wasn’t adequate, there were other solutions. One 
could employ forms of bodily technê in the production of transcendence:
I have sat close up, I have sat farther and farther back, I have tried a 
corner in the theater where I could completely lose myself in the music. 
The better I understood it . . . the farther away I was . . . I stand outside 
in the corridor; I lean up against the partition which divides me from the 
auditorium, and then the impression is most powerful: it is a world by 
itself, separated from me; I can see nothing, but I am near enough to hear, 
and yet infinitely far away.27
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And, as always, there is Wagner who, as a young man, attended a 
rehearsal of Beethoven’s Ninth at the Paris Conservatoire. Arriving 
late, he is placed in a room separated from the main hall by a parti-
tion or half–wall; entranced by the sound coming over the divider, he 
later writes that music, when freed of the visual aspects of its mechanical 
production, “came to the ear in a compact and ethereal sort of unity.”28 
According to Lydia Goehr, the ideal of invisibility in musical performance 
entails two demands: first, that visual aspects of performance are inessential 
given music’s purely sonorous essence; second, that what is heard in the 
performance is subordinated to the transcendent meaning of the work. 
Given that transcendence can never be materialized without loss of fidelity, 
the performer must produce a performance that “undermines their own 
presence as necessarily flawed mediators.”29 The ontological condition of 
sound as the resultant of an event was subordinate to an ontology of sounds 
as bearer of a content whose transcendence is heard in the sounds, and 
whose very status as transcendent undermines their material clothing. The 
signifier cannot sully the (transcendental) signified. 
IX. The fantasy of transcendence produced without technical 
mediation is divine listening. 
Wackenroder articulates the fantasy of unsullied musical transcendence 
through the guise of Joseph Berglinger:
I venture to express from the depths of my being the true meaning of the 
musical art and say: Whenever all the inner vibrations of our heartstrings 
. . . burst apart with one outcry the language of words, as the grave of the 
inner frenzy of the heart—then they go forth under a strange sky, amidst 
the vibrations of blessed harpstrings, in transfigured beauty as if in another 
life beyond this one, and celebrate as angelic figures their resurrection.30
The signifier is the grave in which the musical soul lies; yet the musical 
outcry, which shatters the tomb of language and resurrects the musical soul, 
departs from the subject in its transfiguration. Wackenroder’s image depends 
on the transformation of the heartstring (Herzenfibern) into a harpstring 
(Harfensaiten)—a metamorphosis that musicalizes the language in which 
it is written. Musical sublimity overtakes the subject, carrying the listener 
away to “another life beyond this one.”31
The iconic listener who gladly leaves this world for another life, different in 
kind, is St. Cecilia. In Raphael’s depiction, which circulated widely amongst 
the early German Romantics, Cecilia stands above a pile of discarded 
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and broken instruments, eyes turned upward, listening to the sounds of 
the angelic choir. The angels are positioned in the intermundia: visible 
to the viewer, invisible to the depicted figures, audible only to Cecilia. 
Raphael’s junk heap guarantees that the viewer will not mistake the 
sounds in Cecilia’s ears with any sort of musica mundana. By drawing an 
ontological line between the earthly and the divine, Raphael also grants 
the viewer an image of listening without seeing, which lacks technical me-
diation. Neither Pythagorean veil nor grilled interior separates the figures. 
But Raphael’s image is itself a form of technê that indicates the concep-
tual content of divine listening, but never fills our ears with its sound. For 
Nietzsche, Raphael’s necessary failings deserve mention. 
Populate the air with the imagination of a Raphael and contemplate, as he 
did, how St. Cecilia is listening, enraptured, to the harmonies of angelic 
choirs: no sound issues from this world though it seems to be lost in music.
An image or word stands to music as a schema to a concept; the schema 
can only act as an illustration for the concept but can never be adequately 
substituted for it. It sacrifices generality for phenomenality. If the power of 
the general were to manifest itself directly, all schematism and individuation 
would be burst asunder as quickly as Wackenroder’s grave. 
But if we imagined that this harmony did actually acquire sound by virtue 
of a miracle, where would St. Cecilia, Paul and Magdalen and the singing 
angels suddenly disappear? We would immediately cease to be Raphael, 
and even as the instruments of this world lie broken on the ground in this 
painting, our painter’s vision, conquered by something higher, would pale 
and vanish like shadows.32
X. Divine listening can only be taken on faith. It is solipsistic and 
cannot be shared. It leaves no artifact. It can only be simulated 
through artificial means. 
If divine listening ruptures the order of the signifier and lies beyond all acts 
of individuation, then there can be no artifact of divine listening. It can only 
be taken on faith.
In Kleist’s story, “Holy Cecilia or the Power of Music,” there is no sonic 
account of the transformation, effected by the Corpus Christi Festival 
music, which sublimes the four iconoclastic brothers. Just after the mo-
ment when the music begins, the narrator leaps ahead six years, only to 
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retrospectively relate the events from the perspective of an eyewitness. 
The lacuna is necessary; even a description of the music would not be 
able to bridge the gap, because the question of divine listening is not 
an objective question concerning the music played—for Kleist offers 
precisely such a description in the guise of the witness—but a solipsistic 
question concerning what is being heard in the music by the brothers. 
Although moved by music to the point of self–annihilation, Wackenroder’s 
Joseph does not experience divine listening, as do Kleist’s brothers. 
Wackenroder positions Joseph between the immediacy of divine listening 
and an anxiety directed at musical technê. In the first half of the tale, Cecilia 
remains an icon to whom Joseph begs assistance,
So that I, through music’s power, 
  Master of their souls might be; 
That my soul the world infinite 
Sympathetically penetrate, 
  Intoxicate in Fantasy!33
In the second half of the tale, after Joseph has become a conductor and 
composer, he grows disillusioned and despondent with his new life. 
It is a wretched life that I am leading . . . I thought that I wanted to dream 
on ceaselessly and pour out my full heart in works of art—but how strange 
and austere the very first years of apprenticeship seemed to me. How I felt 
when I stepped behind the curtain! That all the melodies . . . were based 
upon a single compelling mathematical law! That, instead of flying freely, 
I first had to learn to climb about in the awkward scaffolding and cage of 
the grammar of art! How I had to torment myself in order to first produce 
a correct work with the ordinary, scientific, mechanical understanding . . . 
It was a tedious mechanical effort.34
Joseph’s despondency registers his intermediate status: poised between the 
ideal of the transcendent listener and the charlatan who has “stepped behind 
the curtain” to learn the mechanical tricks that produce such transcendence, 
Joseph becomes an icon unlike that of St. Cecilia. By acquiring technê, he 
can no longer experience the transcendence for which it is employed.
Despite the modern distaste for Wackenroder’s style of “outpourings,” one 
could do worse than to recall Joseph’s state of disillusionment. For “sound” 
is easily carried by ahistorical and ideological fantasies that misrecognize 




The immersiveness of sound, its three–dimensionality, set a precedent 
then for the evacuation of the technological apparatus in the production 
of audio, supporting the belief that three–dimensionality overrides the 
fact of mediation, and thereby creates a space that is beyond technology 
and culture. Like the speaking tube of deific transmission, it has been 
necessary to construct and then deny a mechanism that channels, delimits, 
transduces and sanitizes the materiality it transports. These interfaces are 
both technical and conceptual—consisting of wires, circuits, relays, etc. 
and transcendent spaces, such as the ether, the cosmos, or the irreducible 
vibration, to which the technical infrastructures are conceptually attached, 
and through which the presence of technology is masked.35
XI. In the production of transcendence, technology must be 
hidden. It cannot appear as the real cause, but must hide its own 
role by becoming invisible or remaining a black box. 
We know, now, the supernatural wonders wherewith a priesthood once 
deluded childlike men into believing that some good god was manifesting 
himself to them: it was nothing but Mechanism, that ever worked these 
cheating wonders. Thus to–day again the super–natural, just because it is 
the un–natural, can only be brought before a gaping public by the wonders 
of mechanics; and such a wonder is the secret of the Berliozian Orchestra.36
Wagner’s critical words also betray the lesson he learned—hide the 
machinery. 
But a tension runs through Wagner’s thinking. On the one hand, the dream-
like state “into which we thus are plunged through sympathetic hearing” 
produces an experience where “our eyesight is paralyzed” to the point that 
“we no longer intensively see.” This experience of musical blindsight is 
produced anytime the music “really touches us” despite the fact that “the 
most hideous and distracting things are passing before our eye,” such as 
“the highly trivial aspect of the audience itself, the mechanical movements 
of the band, [and] the whole peculiar working apparatus of an orchestral 
production.” Wagner argues from the fact that we are ordinarily inattentive to 
such a spectacle, and that absorbed listening puts us into “a state essentially 
akin to that of hypnotic clairvoyance”.37 
(McLuhan could have cited Wagner to support his claim: “Psychologists 
define hypnosis as the filling of the field of attention by one sense only.”)38
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On the other hand, the subversion of vision by hearing is compromised in the 
opera house, where musical blindsight is unacceptable. Here the mechanism 
of the orchestra must be literally concealed, so as to regulate and discipline 
the attention of the audience in the correct manner.
The reader of my previous essays already knows my views about the 
concealment of the orchestra and . . . [my condemnation of] the constant 
visibility of the mechanism for tone–production as an aggressive nuisance 
. . . I explained how fine performances of ideal works of music may make 
this evil imperceptible at last, through our eyesight being neutralized, as 
it were, by the rapt subversion of the whole sensorium. With a dramatic 
representation, on the contrary, it is a matter of focusing the eye itself 
upon a picture and that can only be done by leading it away from the 
sight of any bodies lying in between such as the technical apparatus for 
projecting the picture.39
But even this might not be enough. In September of 1878, Cosima tran-
scribed this statement:
I cannot stand all this costume and grease–paint business! And when I 
consider how these figures such as Kundry will have to be masqueraded—I 
immediately think of these repulsive artists’ carnivals, and, after having 
invented the invisible orchestra I would like to create the invisible theater.40 
Wagner just missed the mark. The phonograph was invented the year before. 
Even musique concrète, predicated on the use of recorded sound, is also 
premised on concealing the machinery involved in its production, in order 
to produce an acousmatic situation where the ear can begin its act of l’écoute 
réduite. This condition persists from its very moment of discovery.
19th April. By having one of the bells hit I got the sound after the attack. 
Without its percussion the bell becomes an oboe–sound. I prick up my 
ears. Has a breach appeared in the enemy ranks? Has the advantage 
changed sides?41 
Experimenting in the studio, Schaeffer discovered that by removing the 
transient attack from a recording of a bell its source became unrecogniz-
able. Rather than conceptualize this feature as an affordance of recorded 
sound, Schaeffer interpreted his discovery as disclosing an entryway into 
the phenomenology of listening. 
A number of historical circumstances have led to the notion of the sound 
object. First, the initial discoveries of “musique concrète” with its two 
inaugural experiments: the closed groove and the cut bell; then, the aware-
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ness of a listening situation, not new but whose originality had never been 
identified or given a specific name; the acousmatic situation.42 
Like the Gestalt figures that littered the pages of Merleau–Ponty’s 
Phenomenology of Perception, Schaeffer understood this little cloche coupé as 
emblematic of a much larger field—namely a field of listening, constituted 
not simply as a response to an auditory stimulus, but as a field of sound 
objects intentionally constituted by the listener’s acts and modes of attentive-
ness. What this cloche coupé revealed was the way in which the listener’s 
intentionality preceded the auditory stimulus.
One forgets that it is the sound object, given in perception, which designates 
the signal to be studied, and that, therefore, it should never be a question 
of reconstructing it on the basis of the signal.43
Wrap that up with the phenomenological reduction and you’ve got a situation 
where the essence of listening is now understood as being utterly indifferent 
to its mode of presentation, that is, whether the sound was real or imagined. 
Only the content matters, and the content is understood as indifferent to its 
ontological status. (A prolongation of Kantian disinterestedness.) Schaeffer’s 
manipulations become theorized as sonic attempts at “eidetic reduction” via 
Husserl’s method of imaginative free variation. For example, 
Starting from this table–perception . . . we vary the perceptual object, 
table, with a completely free optionalness, yet in such a manner that we 
keep perception fixed as perception of something, no matter what. Perhaps 
we begin by fictionally changing the shape or color of the object quite 
arbitrarily . . . In other words: Abstaining from acceptance of its being, 
we change the fact of this perception into a pure possibility, one among 
other quite “optional” pure possibilities—but possibilities that are possible 
perceptions. We so to speak, shift the actual perception into the realm of 
non–actualities, the realm of the as–if.44
Change the example from a table to a tape loop and you’re well on your way 
to an orthodox musical phantasmagoria—oops, I meant, phenomenology. 
But like the “music room,” this too only succeeds by force of reduction. For 
this kind of phenomenology refuses to recognize the remainder produced in 
its drive towards the eidetic reduction. The question is not simply whether 
a sound can present itself qua perception or qua imagined. Because these 
modes of presentation are not indifferent to the haptic aspect of vibration 
simultaneous with these sounds, a different set of possible modes of pre-
sentation is needed: perceived sounds with perceived vibrations, perceived 
sounds with imagined vibrations, perceived sounds without vibrations; 
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imagined sounds with perceived vibrations, imagined sounds with imag-
ined vibrations, imagined sounds without vibrations; and lastly, perceived 
vibrations without sounds, and imagined vibrations without sounds. Only 
by bracketing the haptic aspect of sonic modes of presentation, can the 
musical phenomenologist be satisfied with free variation as a technique for 
disclosing sonic essences.45
Orthodox musical phenomenology deludes itself about its haptic condition, 
neglecting the fact that the mode of presentation for sounds is not totalized 
between real and imagined perception, or between seeing and hearing, but 
includes another sense modality. But this is not to assert that the haptic aspect 
of vibration is primary for a sonic ontology, for that too would depend on the 
isolation and privilege of one modality from the rest—and the production 
of such isolation would require its own set of techniques. It would be the 
technê of some other phantasmagoric physis. To praise blindness in order to 
privilege listening, as Arnheim did, is to substitute the centrism of the eye 
for that of the ear, while ignoring the incorrigible fact that both modalities 
are not independent of touch. 
That problem, easy to state, is difficult to conceptualize. Even Diderot 
vacillated in his “Letter on the Blind,” calling idealism, “an extravagant 
system, which must have been invented by the blind,” while putting these 
words in the mouth of the blind mathematician Samuelson: “If you want to 
make me believe in God you must make me touch him.”46 
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